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Abstract 
We study the effect of the electoral system on the quality of politicians, measured by the average educational 
attainment, at the local level in Italy over the period 1994-2017. Since 1993, municipalities below 15,000 
inhabitants vote with a single-ballot system, whereas cities above 15,000 inhabitants threshold are subject to 
a double ballot. Exploiting the discontinuous policy change nearby the population cut-off we have implemented 
a RDD and found that runoff elections lead to a decrease in the educational attainment of local politicians by 
about 2% compared to years of schooling of politicians in municipalities voting with a single-ballot scheme. 
We speculate that the negative effect is driven by the different selection process of candidates adopted by 
political parties between runoff and single-ballot system. Findings are similar when we use alternative 
measures of quality of politicians related both to the previous occupation and to previous political experience, 
and when we control for different measures of political closeness.  
 
JEL codes: C31; D72; I20; J42.  
Keywords: Regression discontinuity design; Electoral system; Education; Political competition. 
 
1. Introduction 
As the rules by which citizens elect representatives within institutions depend on the electoral law 
adopted, choosing an electoral system is one of the most crucial decisions for any democracy. Also, 
since it affects the representativeness of the elective bodies and, in turn, the policies implemented by 
the politicians eventually elected, the electoral system bears on the effective application of democratic 
principles. For instance, it has been found that proportional representation and parliamentary systems, 
when compared to majoritarian and presidential systems, lead to higher levels of public expenditures 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2005; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002) and that under plurality rule two-party 
systems usually prevail (Bordignon et al., 2016).  
The majority of contributions in the literature has focused on the impact of electoral systems on 
political competitiveness, public policies (see Chamon et al., 2008; Rizzo and Zanardi, 2010; Bracco 
and Brugnoli, 2012), and turnout (Barone and De Blasio, 2013), even though empirical results are 
mixed. In particular, about the relation between electoral rules and political competition, Callander 
(1999) finds that plurality elections tend to see more candidates running, and Cox and Neto (1997), 
and Chamon et al. (2008) highlight how more candidates are observed in runoff elections. As for 
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Italian municipalities, the same conclusions are reached by Bordignon et al. (2016), who find that 
under runoff elections, the number of candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on 
equilibrium policy is smaller, because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced 
compared to single round elections. Thus, the literature cited confirm that, compared to cities voting 
under a single-ballot rule, in cities that adopt a double-ballot voting system there are more candidates 
competing in the elections, and that a larger number of parties are involved, with the effect of 
increasing the level of political competition. 
In this regard, double-ballot systems might also affect the quality of elected politicians. On the one 
hand, single-ballot elections are characterized by a lower level of political competition, something 
that, with respect to double-ballot elections, should produce a negative effect on the quality of 
politicians and their performance (see for instance, De Paola and Scoppa, 2011; Galasso and 
Nannicini, 2011). On the other hand, since in single-ballot majority systems, mayors are supported 
by one list of candidates only, the risk of total failure for parties in losing the political competition 
increases. As a consequence, compared to runoff elections, under this electoral scheme, political 
parties are urged to select high skilled candidates in support of the mayor. Therefore, the impact of 
the electoral system on the quality of politicians is not unequivocal, and the Italian local scenario 
seems to be appropriate in empirically stressing the causal effect of interest. 
The aim of our paper is to provide evidence on the effect of the electoral system on the quality of 
politicians using data for Italian municipal administrations over the period 1994-2017. With D.L. 
81/1993 a new electoral scheme based on population size was introduced: according to it, 
municipalities below 15,000 inhabitants adopt a single-ballot electoral system, whereas cities above 
that threshold adopt the double-ballot one. The Italian local institutional framework allows us to 
exploit a sharp change in the electoral rule and to implement a quasi-experimental design, namely a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD). In our analysis, we focus on a narrow sample of 
municipalities (Local Linear Regression) nearby the cut-off and compare cities just below and just 
above the threshold. These municipalities are assumed to be comparable in all their baseline 
characteristics (we discuss this assumption later in the paper). Consequently, municipalities adopting 
a single ballot provide a valid counterfactual for municipalities with runoff voting rule and by 
comparing these outcomes we identify the causal effect of interest. To the best of our knowledge this 
is the first contribution that explicitly identifies a causal link between electoral rules and quality of 
politicians as measured by the average years of schooling.  
Our results show that in cities with a double-ballot voting system, the educational attainment of 
local politicians decreases on average by about 2% compared to local politicians in cities just below 
the threshold. Findings tend to be the same when as an alternative measures of quality of politicians 
we use: (1) the rate of local politicians in the municipal apparatus who were engaged in 
entrepreneurial and professional activities before being appointed in the municipal council (previous 
job/occupational status); (2) the rate of local politicians who have a college degree (those with a 
number of years of education equal to or greater than 16); (3) the rate of politicians within the 
municipal bodies who had already been appointed as councilors or aldermen in the previous 
legislature; and (4) the probability of dissolution of the municipal council. Also, our results are not 
sensitive to different specifications of our model, in which we add polynomials of the forcing variable 
higher than one, and use different optimal bandwidths.  
The main explanation driving our results relies on the fact that in municipalities below 15,000 
inhabitants candidates running for mayor are supported only by one single list. In the case of victory, 
the designated mayor, together with his or her supporting list of candidates, will gain full control of 
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local government; otherwise, if he/she loses the competition, the opposition will hold the majority of 
seats within the council. For this reason, parties have a strong incentive in selecting high quality 
politicians (more homogeneous candidates in terms of education in the list supporting the mayor are 
expected). Conversely, in cities above the cut-off candidates may be supported by one or more lists. 
In these municipalities, political parties bring together more lists (more heterogeneous candidates in 
terms of education in each of them are expected) exclusively in order to get more votes, allowing 
their candidates to win the electoral race and become mayors. The more candidates in each list, the 
higher the chance that a candidate supported by parties becomes mayor. In other words, in runoff 
elections, rather than selecting high-skilled candidates, political parties choose those who are more 
capable of attracting electors to cast their vote in their favor at polls, and in turn parties may find it 
optimal to attract low-quality politicians, in order to keep the overall level of party service sufficiently 
high (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2010).  
In addition — and especially in large cities (in Italy only 9% of municipalities have a population 
size larger than 15,000 inhabitants, and in small municipalities most parties cannot be framed in the 
traditional Right/Left political dichotomy) — voters are more sensitive to ideology and party 
affiliation rather than to the candidates’ characteristics. In the first round, when voters have to express 
their preference for the political parties, they cast their vote for the party that they believe to be most 
likely to fulfil their expectations (expressive voting). But it is only in the second round, when votes 
have to be cast in favor of the candidates to mayor (strategic voting), that voters are likely to focus 
on the two best candidates’ features, including their educational attainment. 
Furthermore, it might be the case that electors vote one of the lists supporting mayor candidates 
based not on the latters’ characteristics, including the educational attainment, but on their potential 
connections with candidates (family ties, friendship, and so on). This happens primarily in low-
information environments, where a higher number of candidates or parties causes confused electors 
to cast their vote without considering the candidates’ skills. We formally test this channel by splitting 
the sample based on the median value of population educational attainment, finding a negative effect 
of the runoff on the quality of local politicians only in those cities where voters are poorly educated 
(below the median).  
No other potential channel seems capable to explain the negative effect of the electoral rule on the 
educational attainment of local politicians. In the literature it has been shown that, compared to single-
ballot elections, runoff elections are characterized by a larger number of candidates and political 
parties (these two measures of political closeness are potentially endogenous). Consequently, as a 
further robustness check, we have added some predetermined indicators of political competition: 
these are the percentage electoral margin at the candidate and party level respectively measured at 
time t-1, and the number of candidates and parties running at previous electoral races. Also, after 
controlling for political closeness indicators, we still find that municipalities voting with the runoff 
system are characterized by worse local government apparatus in terms of politicians’ educational 
attainment.  
Our paper also deals with the literature that focuses on the debate about the selection of good 
politicians for enhancing adequate policies and improving economic performance (see among others, 
Besley, Persson, and Sturm, 2007; Jones and Olken, 2005; Besley, 2007). In particular, Besley and 
Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) provide a theoretical framework in which political 
competition is represented as a game where citizens compete to hold public office, and show the 
relevance of politicians’ identity for policy choices. Following this approach, Pande (2003) and 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) investigate the impact of caste and gender reservations on policy 
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choices. Other papers focus, instead, on the effects of politicians' education on economic outcomes. 
Jones and Olken (2005) and Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011) look at the relationship 
between quality of politicians and growth, finding that growth is higher when leaders are more 
educated. Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2011) and Ferraz and Finan (2009), investigating the effects 
of remuneration on the quality and productivity of politicians, show that better paid politicians 
perform better. Finally, Baltrunaite et al. (2014) and Daniele and Geys (2015) look at the causal effect 
of gender quotas and organized crime on local politicians’ educational attainment. We add to this 
literature, investigating the effect produced by an exogenous change in the electoral rule on the quality 
of politicians. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the Italian local institutional 
framework and the datasets used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the methodology 
design and its validity. Section 4 and 5 present the main results, whereas in Section 6 some robustness 
checks are considered. The conclusions are in Section 7. 
 
 
2. Institutional setting and data 
2.1. Municipal elections in Italy 
In Italy, municipal administrations are involved in a number of important tasks, such as managing of 
public utilities (local roads, water, sewage, and garbage collection), providing public housing, 
transportation, nursery schools, and assistance to the elderly. In particular, the main bodies of a 
municipality are the Executive Committee (“Giunta Comunale”) and the City Council (“Consiglio 
Comunale”). The executive authority is assigned to a Mayor (“Sindaco”) heading the Executive 
Committee, while the City Council is endowed with a monitoring role and some residual powers, 
especially regarding budgetary controls. Since the services provided by municipalities have a great 
impact on the citizens’ daily lives, voters are generally very interested in the composition as well as 
in the performance of the municipal apparatus.  
The system currently regulating municipal elections in Italy was introduced in 1993 (D. L.  
81/1993), providing for the direct election of the mayor with some differences according to the size 
of the city. Since 1993, mayors have been subject to a two-term limit, while members of the Executive 
Committee and of the City Council can be re-elected indefinitely. Municipal elections in Italy are 
held every 5 years3 and municipal governments cannot choose the election schedule. In certain 
circumstances, the legislature may not survive until the end of its legislative term, e.g. because of a 
mayor’s early resignation. In these cases, elections are held earlier than their original schedule and, 
as a consequence, compared to the other municipalities that have completed their legislative term 
according to the regular schedule, all subsequent elections will be held at different times. 
Municipalities keep a registry of eligible voters, which is revised whenever there is an election. All 
citizens who are 18 or older on the election date are automatically registered to vote. Voting takes 
place in polling stations organized by the local authorities. Elections are organized according to a 
traditional paper ballot system.  
Moreover, in municipalities with a population size smaller than 15,000 inhabitants elections are 
held with single ballot: the candidate with the highest number of votes is elected (relative majority). 
Whoever has obtained the highest number of votes becomes a mayor and the connected list wins 2/3 
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of the council seats; the remaining third is divided among the other parties or coalitions based on the 
percentages obtained. The first seats of the majority lists belong to those candidates running for a 
mayor position who are not elected. If the two leading candidates running for a mayor position 
received the same number of votes, a second ballot will be held on the second following Sunday. In 
case of further tie, the oldest candidate is elected. 
Conversely, in municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, elections are held with double 
ballot: if in the first round none of the candidates obtains an absolute majority (50% + 1 of the votes), 
a second ballot is held between the two most voted candidates on the following second Sunday. Each 
candidate can be connected to one or more lists and electors can express two choices: one for the 
mayor and one for the list of councilors. It is possible to choose a different list from that in which the 
candidate to whom the elector has expressed his vote is grouped (separate vote). In the intermediate 
phase between the first and second round, the two candidates who go to ballot can link to lists other 
than those who had supported them in the first round. In the second round, electors can only express 
a vote for candidates running for a mayor position, while votes on the lists are not allowed. 
As far as the election of councilors within the municipal apparatus is concerned, in municipalities 
with a population size smaller than 15,000 inhabitants each mayor candidate is connected to only one 
list. Therefore, when a candidate is elected, the list of councilors connected to him/her is chosen 
automatically. Each electoral list must be composed by a number of candidates not higher than the 
number of councilors to be elected by law and not less than 3/4 of the total. Voters can express a 
preference for the councilors of the list connected to the chosen mayor candidate by writing their last 
name under the list. In municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, instead, the lists must 
include a number of candidates not exceeding the number of councilors to be elected by law and not 
less than 2/3 of the total. Once votes are cast, three different situations can arise for the election of 
the council: 1) the mayor is elected in the first round, but the list or lists linked to the mayor do not 
reach 50% of the votes: in this case the seats are distributed according to the proportional d’Hondt 
rule and it is possible that the City Council may be composed for the majority by members of the 
opposition in the event that the list or the lists of one of the defeated candidates have obtained more 
than 50% of the votes; 2) the list or the lists connected to the candidate elected in the first round 
reaches 40% of the votes and no other list exceeds 50%. In this case, the list attached to the elected 
candidate is awarded the majority prize (60% of the seats). The remaining seats are assigned with the 
d’Hondt method; 3) the mayor is elected at the ballot, but the supporting list gets already in the first 
round 40% of the votes and none of the other lists has reached 50%: even in this case the list is 
awarded the majority prize (60%) and the rest of the seats is assigned with the proportional method 
(d’Hondt system). Lists that have not reached the 3% threshold of votes are not admitted to the 
distribution of seats.  
Summing up, it is clear that in municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants the elected mayor 
will certainly have a majority in council; this may not happen in municipalities with more than 15,000 
inhabitants, where the mayor may be in fact elected along with a council controlled by the opposition. 
 
2.2 Data description 
In our analysis we have used three different sources of data: first, an administrative dataset provided 
by the Ministry of the Interior containing detailed information on gender, age, and education level of 
all politicians elected in Italian municipalities from 1985 to 2017; second, an electoral dataset 
provided by the Italian Ministry of the Internal Affairs containing information for all municipal 
 6 
elections on the number of voters and the number of individuals eligible to vote over the period 1994-
2017; and third, 1991, 2001 and 2011 Italian Census of Population. Since the electoral reform 
introducing the double ballot came into force in 1993, we restrict our analysis over the period 1994-
2017 for first round elections, and we end up with a sample of 4,165 observations for 1,173 
municipalities. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Discontinuity Sample 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max Observations4 
Education of Politicians 14.0018 1.3771 8 18 4,165 
High Skill 0.3544 0.2392 0 1 4,165 
Graduated Politicians 0.3563 0.1701 0 1 4,081 
Incumbent Mayor 0.5798 0.4936 0 1 4,165 
Incumbent Politicians 0.5029 0.1707 0 1 4,165 
Dissolution 0.0555 0.2289 0 1 3,658 
Education of Mayors 15.3808 3.0761 5 18 3,913 
Education of Councilors 13.7592 1.3066 8 18 3,985 
Education of Aldermen 14.2099 2.0912 7 18 3,346 
Education of Male Politicians 13.8084 1.4570 8 18 4,149 
Education of Female Politicians 14.8565 2.1852 5 18 3,701 
Rate of Female Politicians 0.1966 0.1255 0.0344 1 3,783 
Age of Politicians 44.2797 3.9833 30 71 4,165 
Female Politicians 0.9083 0.2886 0 1 4,165 
Population Size/1,000 12.372 3.9431 7.553 22.389 4,165 
Voter Turnout 0.7751 0.0787 0.4562 0.9253 4,165 
Education Pop 7.7307 1.0171 4.9863 11.7465 4,165 
Employment 0.3320 0.1302 0.0549 0.8298 4,165 
Area (in sq. km.) 50.0809 53.9059 1.62 551 4,165 
Candidates Electoral Margin 0.1371 0.1134 0 0.7144 4,152 
Candidates Electoral Margin (t-1) 0.1366 0.1147 0 0.7144 3,454 
Parties Electoral Margin 0.1220 0.1105 0 0.7144 3,475 
Parties Electoral Margin (t-1) 0.1249 0.1249 0 0.7144 2,847 
No. Parties 5.3579 3.9582 1 36 3,484 
No. Parties (t-1) 5.0223 3.6272 1 36 2,858 
No. Candidates 3.7377 1.3171 2 16 4,152 
No. Candidates (t-1) 3.7423 1.3521 2 16 3,454 
      
Source: Local Administrators Data set (1985-2011), Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs; Italian Census of Population (1991- 2001-2011) 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our empirical exercise. We build 
our main outcome variable Education of Politicians (with a mean of 14) as the average educational 
attainment of all members within local municipalities at the time of elections. In our sample, the rate 
of politicians with a college degree is about 36% (Graduated Politicians). We have adopted this 
variable from previous work by, among others, De Paola and Scoppa (2010), and Baltrunaite et al. 
(2014), where human capital is considered as a valid proxy for individuals’ ability and skills. The 
average education level of local politicians in a given municipality is calculated on annual basis by 
expressing their degrees with the minimum number of years necessary to obtain them5. Also, given 
the detailed information of the dataset, we are also able to distinguish between the educational level 
of mayors, i.e. Education of Mayors (with a mean of 15.38 and a standard deviation of 3.08), the 
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municipal apparatus on all of covariates, including province-year fixed effect and using an optimal bandwidth as proposed 
by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). 
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educational attainment of councilors, namely Education of Councilors (with a mean of 13.76 and a 
standard deviation of 1.31), and of members of the Executive Committee, i.e. Education of Aldermen 
(with a mean of 14.21 and a standard deviation of 2.09). Moreover, we also distinguish between the 
average years of schooling of male and female local politicians, namely Education of Male Politicians 
and Education of Female Politicians, with a mean of 13.81 and 14.86 respectively.  
With the information regarding local politicians’ previous occupational status, we have built High 
Skill, that is, the rate of politicians (roughly 35% in our sample) in the government apparatus who 
were engaged in entrepreneurial and professional activities before obtaining a seat in a municipal 
council. Conversely, using information about the local administrators’ past political experience, we 
have built three different variables: a dummy variable Incumbent Mayor taking the value of 1 when 
local politicians were appointed mayor during the previous legislature and zero otherwise; a variable 
Incumbent Politicians as measured by the rate of local politicians serving as councilors or aldermen 
during the previous legislature; and, finally, a dummy variable Dissolution that takes a value of 1 if 
the municipal council experienced a dissolution and zero otherwise6. From Table 1, we can find that 
in 57% of municipal bodies there is a politician who has already served as mayor in the previous 
legislature; that the rate of aldermen and councilors who served in the same quality in the past is about 
50%; and that only 5% of municipal councils were dissolved.  
 Furthermore, with the information on candidates’ gender we have built a dummy variable Female 
Politicians taking the value of 1 when there is at least one woman among local politicians: the rate of 
municipal bodies in which there is at least a woman is about 91% with a standard deviation of 0.29, 
whereas the rate of female politicians within municipal bodies is about 20 %. Finally, local politicians 
are on average 44 years old. 
Also, we measure Voter Turnout as the ratio between the number of actual voters and the number 
of eligible voters in the first round. As shown in Table 1, in our sample, the average turnout over the 
period 1994-2017 has been of 77.5%, with a standard deviation of 0.08. Using information on Italian 
local electoral outcomes, we have also built some proxies of the degree of competition characterizing 
each electoral race. We have information on the number of votes obtained by each candidate/party 
and we have created the variables Candidates Electoral Margin and Parties Electoral Margin as the 
absolute difference between the votes obtained by the two leading candidates/parties (divided by the 
number of eligible voters). These two proxies represent an inverse measure of expected electoral 
closeness and are on average equal to 0.137 and 0.121 respectively7. Another proxy of the degree of 
political competition is the number of candidates/parties competing at the electoral race (No. 
Candidates with an average of 3.74 and a standard deviation of 1.32, and No. Parties with a mean of 
5.45 and a standard deviation of 4). Moreover, as further indicators of competitiveness, we use the 
margin by which the incumbent candidate/party won the previous election and the lagged value of 
the number of candidates/parties. 
Finally, to control for municipalities’ demographic characteristics, we use the 1991, 2001 and 2011 
Italian Census of Population. Data from the 1991 census are used for elections held in the period 
1994-2000, data from the 2001 census are used for elections held between 2001 and 2010, while data 
from 2011 census are used for elections held over 2011-2017 period. We have information on the 
size of resident population, the average level of employment, the educational attainment of the 
                                                 
6 We observe whether the term limit of mayors and councilors lasted less than 4 years (for elections held before 1999) or 
less than 5 years (for elections held from 2000 onwards) for the period 1994-2012. 
7 The value 0 characterizes few elections in which the two leading candidates/parties obtained exactly the same number 
of votes. 
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population, and the municipal area in sq. km. As shown in Table 1, the average population size in our 
sample is 12,372, the average educational attainment of population — by considering only people 
aged 6 or above — is about 8 years, whereas the fraction of employed people in the population is 
33%. 
 
3. Empirical framework and validity of the RDD 
3.1 Methodology 
To recover the causal effect of the electoral system on local politicians’ average years of schooling, 
we use a quasi-experimental design and implement a sharp Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), 
since the local electoral system (single ballot vs runoff) exogenously changes around the 15,000 
inhabitants cut-off. The probability that a municipality has a population just above or just below the 
threshold is understood to be random, and helps us overcome difficulties arising from the presence 
of confounding and unobservable factors that affect local politicians’ educational attainment. 
Consequently, we are able to compare cities adopting a single-ballot system (below the 15,000 
inhabitants threshold) to municipalities using a double ballot (just above the same cut-off). We have 
decided to estimate a Local Linear Regression (henceforth LLR), by means of OLS with fixed effects 
at the province level, controlling for a linear polynomial of the normalized forcing variable, i.e. 
population size, along with an interaction term of the first order between the treatment and the 
assignment variable, and choosing an optimal bandwidth as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012). The basic econometric specification is therefore the following: 
 
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑝 + µ𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,  [1] 
where 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 is a variable measuring the educational attainment of local 
politicians, as measured by the average years of schooling (De Paola and Scoppa, 2010; Baltrunaite 
et al., 2014; Daniele and Geys, 2015), whereas 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is a linear polynomial of the normalized 
assignment variable (population size minus 15,000)8. Furthermore, 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of controls for local 
politicians’ characteristics. In particular, it contains the average age of local politicians, and a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 when there is at least a woman within municipal bodies. 𝑋𝑖𝑡is a vector 
including controls for municipal characteristics (the average educational attainment of inhabitants, 
the share of employed people in the population, the municipal area and the electoral participation at 
the polls), φpandµt are respectively a province and a year fixed effect, whereas 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the stochastic 
error term of the model. The fixed effects 𝜑𝑝  accounts for time-invariant characteristics of the 
province, either observable or unobservable. 
In all regressions standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the municipal 
level to take into account that the quality of politicians in the same municipality may be affected by 
common shocks.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In the main specification we use a linear polynomial of the forcing variable. As reported in the robustness checks section, 
we also run a LLR by means of OLS (with province-year fixed effect) with polynomials of population size higher than 1. 
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3.2 Regression discontinuity design validity checks 
It is standard in the RD design to demonstrate that treatment and control groups are similar in their 
observed baseline covariates. To verify whether the assumptions of the RD are satisfied, we present 
a test of the continuity of the distribution of the covariates added in the main specification at the cut-
point. The idea behind this kind of test is to regress a covariate on a first or second order polynomial 
of the forcing variable along with a dummy for the treatment status: a statistically insignificant 
coefficient for the treatment dummy is taken as evidence in favor of local random assignment 
(Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Lee, 2008; Lee, Moretti and Butler, 2004). 
In Table 2, in the neighborhood with the 15,000 inhabitants threshold, by choosing an optimal 
bandwidth as suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), we test whether the runoff is predictive 
of a larger set of municipal and candidates’ characteristics. We control for a quadratic polynomial of 
the forcing variable, for a second order interaction term between the assignment variable and the 
treatment status, and for province-year fixed effects. Moreover, standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the municipal level. Overall, as highlighted in Table 2, local 
electoral rule does not predict any of the predetermined characteristics. 
 
Table 2: Balance Test on Control Variables  
Variables Optimal 
Bandwidth 
Obs. 
Age of Politicians -0.5076 
(0.4098) 
4,165 
Female Politicians 0.0445 
(0.0319) 
4,165 
Rate of Female Politicians -0.0139 
(0.0108) 
3,783 
Voter Turnout 
 
Education Pop 
0.0011 
(0.0058) 
0.0059 
(0.0752) 
4,165 
 
4,165 
Employment 0.0097 
(0.0135) 
4,165 
Area (in sq. Km.) 3.0719 
(6.6248) 
4,165 
Note: Municipalities between 7,550 and 22,450 inhabitants. Baseline RDD estimates. We control for province and year fixed 
effects and we focus on the period 1994-2017. Estimation method: LLR with a second order polynomial of the forcing along with 
an interaction of the second order between the treatment status and the assignment variable. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at municipal level (shown in brackets). Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 
5% level by **, and at 1% level by ***. 
 
As a further test, in Figure 1 we present some descriptive graphs of the predetermined 
characteristics plotted against population size nearby the 15,000 inhabitants cut-off. Each figure 
shows the assignment variable cell means of the predetermined characteristics in the proximity of the 
population threshold along with the fitted values of a locally weighted regression that is calculated 
within each segment. On the whole, Figure 1 confirms results highlighted in Table 2.  
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Figure 1: Discontinuity in the predetermined characteristics at the 15,000 cut-off  
 
As a last specification test of our design, we check the continuity of the forcing variable (i.e. 
population size) nearby the cut-off of 15,000 inhabitants and perform a McCrary test by running a 
kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of the threshold 
(McCrary, 2008). If there were any discontinuities at the cut-off point, one might be concerned that 
mayors are able to manipulate the assignment variable and sort below/above the threshold in order to 
pass from an electoral system to the other. In other words, if units of observation have a great deal of 
control over the assignment variable and if there is a perceived benefit to a treatment, one would 
certainly expect units of observation on one side of the threshold (single-ballot municipalities) to be 
systematically different from those on the other side (double-ballot municipalities)9. As we can see 
in Figure 2, when we consider municipalities with a population size lower than 30,000 inhabitants, 
the log of the frequency of population size to the right and to the left of the threshold is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels, as it equals 0.1895 with a standard deviation of 0.1178. 
 
                                                 
9
 However, in principle, it is very hard in Italy to manipulate population size at the municipal level: indeed, Census is run 
independently by the National Statistical Office, so that false reporting should be ruled out. 
 11 
 
Figure 2: McCrary test. Manipulation of the forcing variable at the 15,000 cut-off 
 
4. Main results 
Table 3 reports the main Sharp RDD results where an optimal bandwidth, as proposed by Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012) (hereafter IK), has been adopted. In column (1) we only control for province 
and year fixed effects, while in column (2) we have added a linear interaction term between the 
treatment status and the normalized forcing variable that is population size. In columns (3) and (4) 
we control for candidates’ features and municipal characteristics respectively. 
In all specifications we have used a linear polynomial of the forcing variable. Standard errors are 
robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the municipal level in order to take into account potential 
common shocks affecting municipalities. 
Results highlight how municipalities voting under runoff are characterized by a lower quality of 
local politicians, as measured by the average educational attainment, compared to cities using a 
single-ballot scheme (columns 1-4). In fact, the change in the electoral system leads to a reduction in 
the level of education of local politicians by 0.293 years (see column 4). The coefficient of interest is 
statistically significant and stable across specifications. This corresponds to a 2.09% decrease with 
respect to the average value of 14 years of education in the 7,550-22,450 population window.  
One channel through which runoff scheme reduces the educational attainment of local politicians 
is related to the features of the double-ballot system per se, given that in cities above the 15,000 cut-
off candidates running for a mayor position are usually supported by more than one list, whereas in 
single-ballot elections candidates are affiliated to one list only10. In fact, in elections held under runoff 
voting, where more lists support candidates that run for a mayor position, political parties may select 
candidates with no regard for their intrinsic qualities, such as experience or educational attainment, 
but on the basis of some other factors, such as family ties or connections, in order to attract electors 
to cast their vote in their favor at polls.  
                                                 
10 Within the government apparatus, runoff elections positively affect the diversity of local politicians with regards to 
their average years of schooling, as measured by the standard deviation of the average educational attainment. The 
coefficient of the treatment variable is 0.1209 (p-value: 0.008).  
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Moreover, elements such as the ideology of voters or their affiliation to parties become more 
important when compared to candidates’ skills in large municipalities,11 and especially in cities above 
15,000 voting under runoff. This applies especially in the first round, as in the second one voters 
cannot cast any vote to parties and in order to elect their best candidate have to focus exclusively on 
the latter’s qualities, such as their educational attainment. 
 
Table 3. Effect of Runoff Elections on Average Education. Sharp RDD. LLR Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
High Skill 
      
Runoff -0.206** -0.241** -0.246** -0.292*** -0.0262** 
 (0.0978) (0.0998) (0.0994) (0.0932) (0.0129) 
Age of Politicians   -0.0201** -0.0377*** -0.0049*** 
   (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0014) 
Female Politicians   -0.360*** -0.387*** -0.0061 
   (0.116) (0.114) (0.0165) 
Voter Turnout    -0.706 -0.155** 
    (0.455) (0.0632) 
Employment    -0.112 0.0692* 
    (0.259) (0.0385) 
Area    0.0016*** 0.0001 
    (0.0005) (0.0001) 
Education Pop    0.712*** 0.0137* 
    (0.0548) (0.0077) 
Constant 14.41*** 14.36*** 15.64*** 10.74*** 0.209** 
 (0.343) (0.353) (0.583) (0.740) (0.0987) 
      
Population Polynomial First First First First First 
Interaction Term No First First First First 
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Optimal Bandwidth IK IK IK IK IK 
Observations 4,169 4,169 4,169 4,165 4,222 
R-squared 0.276 0.277 0.283 0.332 0.573 
Note: Municipalities between 7,550 and 22,450 inhabitants. Sharp RDD estimates. We control for province and year fixed effects and 
focus on the period 1994-2017. Estimation method: LLR with a first order polynomial of the forcing variable and interaction term. 
Standard Errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the municipal level (shown in brackets). Significance at the 10% 
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
 
In column (5) we look at a different measure of the quality of politicians, namely their previous 
occupation. We have considered the share of politicians in the government apparatus who were 
engaged in entrepreneurial and professional activities before obtaining a seat in a municipal council, 
and we have built the variable High Skill with a mean of 0.3543 within the 7,550-22,450 population 
range, and a standard deviation of 0.2392. A higher rate of politicians whose previous occupation is 
skill-intensive would be interpreted as an indicator of the higher quality of the political body. We 
have found that runoff elections lead to a lower rate of high-skilled local politicians by 2.6% 
(corresponding to a decrease of more than 7%). 
One potential concern with estimates presented in Table 3 might be that the IK optimal bandwidth, 
a –/+49% above and below the threshold, is quite wide and includes election outcomes that might be 
                                                 
11
 In small municipalities, the rate of liste civiche, i.e. parties that do not belong to either the Left or the Right, is very 
high. In particular, in towns with a population size lower than 5,000 only liste civiche can present electoral lists. In these 
municipalities voters are more sensitive to the candidates’ characteristics rather than to ideology or party affiliation. 
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reasonably considered far from close. To address this potential issue, we have replicated 
specifications reported in Table 3 after narrowing the bandwidth to half the optimal. This alternative 
method leads to an optimal bandwidth of 3,725 inhabitants above and below the 15,000 inhabitants 
cut-off. Results are displayed in Table 4. The impact of runoff is still negative, stable across 
specifications, statistically significant at the 5% level, and similar in terms of magnitude to the impact 
described in Table 3. Under runoff voting, the educational attainment of local politicians and the rate 
of high quality administrators reduce by 0.26 years and 3.6% respectively (see columns 4 and 5). 
 
Table 4. Effect of Runoff Elections on Average Education. Sharp RDD. LLR Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
High Skill 
      
Runoff -0.298** -0.296** -0.298** -0.266** -0.0360** 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) (0.118) (0.0177) 
Constant 14.35*** 14.36*** 16.19*** 11.94*** 0.304** 
 (0.377) (0.377) (0.802) (1.093) (0.147) 
      
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No No Politicians Demographic All 
Population Polynomial First First First First First 
Interaction Term No First First First First 
Optimal Bandwidth Half IK Half IK Half IK Half IK Half IK 
Observations 1,692 1,692 1,692 1,688 1,713 
R-squared 0.321 0.321 0.328 0.362 0.591 
Note: Municipalities between 11,275 and 18,725 inhabitants. Sharp RDD estimates. We control for province and year fixed effects and 
focus on the period 1994-2017. Estimation method: LLR with a first order polynomial of the forcing variable and interaction term. 
Standard Errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the municipal level (shown in brackets). Significance at the 10% 
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
 
Sharp RDD results are also shown in Figure 3. In particular, we plot the mean of our outcome 
variables against the 15,000 population threshold, with a half IK optimal bandwidth, by estimating a 
model that assumes a linear relationship between our dependent variables and the forcing variable. 
The connected points show the predicted values from a linear regression of our different measures of 
the quality of politicians on population size. In particular, in the left panel we focus on the average 
educational attainment of all of local politicians, whereas in the right panel the focus is on the rate of 
high skilled politicians. Overall, these descriptive graphs confirm the results displayed in Table 4. 
 
 
Figure 3: Sharp RDD. Effect of Runoff on the Quality of Politicians at the 15,000 cut-off  
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In Table 5 we re-estimate the specification reported in column (4) of Table 4, but as alternative 
measures of the quality of politicians we have used: (1) the rate of local politicians who hold a college 
degree (column 1); (2) a dummy variable for the presence of the incumbent mayor within the 
municipal apparatus (column 2); (3) the rate of local politicians who in the previous legislature had 
already served as councilors or aldermen (column 3); and (4) a dummy variable taking the value of 1 
if the municipal council has been dissolved and zero otherwise (column 4). 
In particular, under runoff voting municipalities display a lower rate of politicians with a college 
degree in municipal councils by 4.26% compared to cities voting under a single-ballot scheme. 
Conversely, in column (2) and (3) we have looked at local politicians’ past political experience: runoff 
elections lead to a lower share of individuals with “political skills” (incumbent councilors and 
aldermen) by 8.83%, whereas, as expected, no effect is found on the probability of having an 
incumbent mayor in the municipal apparatus. This is due primarily to the fact that local politicians 
had not performed well in the past, which prevented them from being appointed in following electoral 
competitions. Finally, in column (4) we have looked at the effect of the electoral rule on the 
probability that a municipal council can be dissolved. In fact, Italian laws allow the central 
government to forcefully remove municipal bodies when specific circumstances occur: collusion with 
organized crime; budget mismanagement; major criminal offenses by the mayor or the city council 
members at large; resignation of the mayor, or of more than 50% of councilors. Municipal dissolution 
by the central government provides a relevant signal about the reputation and quality of politicians. 
We have found that municipalities under runoff voting experience a higher probability of municipal 
council dissolution by 4.2% compared to municipalities voting under single ballot12.  
 
Table 5. Effect of Runoff Elections on Alternative Measures of Politicians’ Quality. Sharp RDD. LLR Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Graduated 
Politicians 
Incumbent  
Mayor 
Incumbent 
Politicians 
Dissolution 
     
Runoff -0.0426** 0.0069 -0.0883*** 0.0577** 
 (0.0186) (0.0497) (0.0153) (0.0286) 
Constant 0.0895 0.180 0.529*** 0.394* 
 (0.1728) (0.359) (0.138) (0.203) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Polynomial First First First First 
Interaction term First First First First 
Optimal Bandwidth Half IK Half IK Half IK Half IK 
Observations 1,677 1,713 1,713 1,507 
R-squared 0.245 0.148 0.319 0.083 
Note: Municipalities between 11,275 and 18,725 inhabitants. Sharp RDD estimates. We control for province and year fixed effects and 
we focus on the period 1994-2017. Estimation method: LLR with a first order polynomial of the forcing variable and interaction term. 
Standard Errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the municipal level (show in brackets). Significance at the 10% 
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Descriptive graphs confirm results displayed in Table 6. We do not report them for reasons of space, but they are 
available upon request. 
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5. Runoff and Quality of Politicians: Heterogeneous Effects 
The richness of our collected dataset allows us to investigate whether the change in the electoral 
system affects the educational attainment — measured by years of schooling — of mayors, 
councilors, aldermen, male and female local politicians around the 15,000 threshold separately. Table 
6 reports the results. 
In cities just above the cut-off, mayors have an educational attainment lower than the level of 
education of mayors in municipalities just below the threshold by 0.757 years. In other words, under 
runoff voting, the education of mayors is lower by roughly 4.89% compared to the average value of 
15.48 in our sample, using a half IK optimal bandwidth. The coefficient attached to our treatment 
variable is significant at the 10% level. We have found similar results (the significance is at the 1% 
level), when our outcome variable is measured by years of schooling of councilors (we observe a 
decrease of 2.75% passing from single to double ballot). Furthermore, under runoff voting the 
educational attainment of male politicians in the local government apparatus is lower compared to 
municipalities voting under single-ballot by roughly 0.3 years of schooling. Conversely, no effect is 
found on the education of female politicians and aldermen (in this case we did not expect to detect 
any impact, given that mayors directly choose aldermen once the local government is composed).  
 
Table 6. Effect of Runoff Elections on Education for Mayors, Councilors and Aldermen. Sharp RDD.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES Education of 
Mayors 
Education of 
Councilors 
Education of 
Aldermen 
Education of 
Male Politicians 
Education of 
Female Politicians 
      
Runoff -0.757* -0.378*** -0.0715 -0.296** -0.0054 
 (0.406) (0.116) (0.257) (0.126) (0.248) 
Constant 13.04*** 11.98*** 13.60*** 12.09*** 9.785*** 
 (2.813) (1.026) (2.225) (1.202) (1.697) 
      
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Polynomial  First First First First First 
Interaction term First First First First First 
Optimal Bandwidth Half IK Half IK Half IK Half IK Half IK 
Observations 1,577 1,614 1,302 1,685 1,497 
R-squared 0.179 0.403 0.211 0.343 0.219 
Note: Municipalities between 11,275 and 18,725 inhabitants. Sharp RDD estimates. We control for province and year fixed effects and 
we focus on the period 1994-2017. Estimation method: LLR with a first order polynomial of the forcing. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the municipal level (shown in brackets). Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 
5% level by **, and at 1% level by ***. 
 
In Figure 4, we plot Sharp RDD results presented in Table 6. In particular, we focus on the average 
educational attainment of all mayors (top-left panel), councilors (top-right panel), aldermen (middle-
left panel), male politicians (middle-right panel), and female politicians (bottom panel). Again, 
descriptive graphs confirm results displayed in Table 6 and, in passing from a single to a double 
ballot, highlight a sharp decrease in the education level of local politicians. 
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Figure 4: Sharp RDD. Heterogeneous Effect of Runoff on Education at the 15,000 cut-off  
 
The channels through which the runoff rule affects the quality of local politicians may work 
differently according to the educational attainment of population. In order to investigate the 
heterogeneous effect of the double-ballot rule on the education of politicians, we have run separate 
regressions13 splitting the sample based on the median value (7.680873) of the variable Education 
Pop.  
                                                 
13
 The regressions are the same as those reported in column (4) of Table 4, in which we consider the full set of controls. 
 17 
Table 7 reports the results. In columns (1) and (2) we have focused on the municipalities in our 
sample (half IK optimal bandwidth) with an educational attainment of the resident population above 
the median, whereas in columns (3) and (4) we look at cities characterized by a low level of education 
(below the median). Moreover, in odd specifications we have controlled for province and year fixed 
effects only, while in even columns we have added the full set of controls. In all specifications, we 
have used a linear polynomial of the forcing variable along with a linear interaction term between the 
treatment and the normalized population size. 
In sum, runoff scheme negatively affects the quality of local politicians — measured by their 
average years of schooling — only in those municipalities with a low level of education. In particular, 
in these cities (below the median) runoff leads to a reduction in the education of politicians by 0.3 
years, corresponding to a decrease of 2.21% compared to the average value of 13.73 in our sample 
where a half IK optimal bandwidth is applied. The coefficient is stable across specifications reported 
in columns (3) and (4) and is significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 7. Runoff Elections and Education of Politicians. Heterogeneity based on Education population. LLR Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Above Median 
Education Pop 
Above Median 
Education Pop 
Below Median 
Education Pop 
Below Median 
Education Pop 
     
VARIABLES Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
     
Runoff -0.198 -0.190 -0.334* -0.370** 
 (0.189) (0.176) (0.186) (0.175) 
Constant 15.02*** 12.13*** 15.10*** 9.879*** 
 (0.547) (1.815) (0.307) (1.602) 
     
Controls No  All No All 
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Polynomial First First First First 
Interaction term First First First First 
Optimal Bandwidth Half IK Half IK Half IK Half IK 
Observations 893 893 799 796 
R-squared 0.306 0.344 0.381 0.427 
Note: Municipalities between 11,275 and 18,725 inhabitants. Sharp RDD estimates. We control for province and year fixed effects and 
we focus on the period 1994-2017. Estimation method: LLR with a first order polynomial of the forcing. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the municipal level (shown in brackets). Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 
5% level by **, and at 1% level by ***. 
 
 
6. Robustness checks 
As a first check, in Table 8 we have adopted several specifications of our model in order to assess the 
sensitivity and magnitude of the runoff system effect on the quality of politicians. In particular, in 
column (1) of Table 8, as done previously in Table 3, we have used an IK optimal bandwidth and 
added a quadratic function of the normalized forcing variable along with a second order interaction 
term between Runoff and population size. In column (2) we have replicated the specifications of 
column (1), but adding the full set of controls. Results are similar to those previously presented: 
runoff elections lead to a decrease in the average years of schooling of local politicians by 0.255 years 
(see column 2). 
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Table 8. Effect of Runoff Elections on Average Education with Several Bandwidths and Polynomials. Sharp RDD.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
High Skill 
      
Runoff -0.257* -0.255** -0.369*** -0.307** -0.0418** 
 (0.135) (0.129) (0.139) (0.133) (0.0206) 
Constant 14.35*** 10.74*** 14.95*** 12.77*** 0.397** 
 (0.359) (0.742) (0.444) (1.243) (0.166) 
      
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes 
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Polynomial Second Second First First First 
Interaction term Second Second First First First 
Optimal Bandwidth IK IK CCT CCT CCT 
Observations 4,169 4,165 1,274 1,270 1,291 
R-squared 0.277 0.332 0.346 0.384 0.610 
Note: Sharp RDD estimates. We control for province and year fixed effects and we focus on the period 1994-2017. Estimation method: 
LLR. Standard Errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the municipal level (shown in brackets). Significance at the 
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at 1% level by ***. 
 
In columns (3) and (4), instead, as optimal bandwidth we have used that proposed by Calonico et 
al. (2018) (hereafter: CCT). We have collected a sample of 2,700 observations above and below the 
15,000 cut-off. The effect of runoff rule is still negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Finally, in column (5), using CCT optimal bandwidth, we have measured our outcome variable as the 
share of high skilled local politicians in the municipal bodies. Again, the effect of runoff rule on the 
quality of politicians is negative and significant at conventional levels14. 
In sum, findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of higher order polynomials of the population 
size and to the use of different optimal bandwidths. In all specifications we have found a negative 
and statistically significant effect of runoff elections on the quality of politicians. 
As a second test, using half IK optimal bandwidth and a linear polynomial of the forcing variable 
with a first order interaction term, we have presented estimations, where we have included different 
predetermined measures of political competition among control variables. Another potential channel 
explaining the negative effect of the electoral system on the educational attainment of politicians is 
indeed the level of political competition characterizing the electoral race. Many authors (see for 
instance, Bordignon et al., 2016; Cox and Neto, 1997, and Chamon et al., 2008) found that compared 
to single-ballot elections, under runoff voting a larger number of candidates and political parties 
compete. We have not expressly added among regressors either the number of candidates running for 
a mayor position, or the number of parties competing at the electoral race in the previous estimations, 
because they are potentially endogenous.  
Results are reported in Table 9. In columns (1) and (2) respectively, we have included the 
difference in the votes obtained by the two most voted candidates over the total number of eligible 
voters at time t-1, and the percentage difference in votes between the two leading parties at time t-1, 
which are two inverse measures of expected electoral closeness. In columns (3) and (4) respectively, 
we have simply used the number of candidates and parties competing in the previous electoral race. 
                                                 
14 Results are similar when we use the alternative measures of the quality of politicians as those presented in Table 5. 
 19 
In all specifications, the effect of runoff system on the average years of schooling of candidates is 
still negative and significant at the 1% level, independently of the political closeness measure used. 
This suggests that the lower educational level of politicians in cities above the threshold compared to 
that in municipalities below the cut-off is not driven by the divergence in the level of political 
closeness characterizing the two electoral regimes. 
 
Table 9. Effect of Runoff Elections on Average Education with Measures of Political Competition. Sharp RDD.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
Education of 
Politicians 
     
Runoff -0.328*** -0.444*** -0.334*** -0.446*** 
 (0.125) (0.136) (0.126) (0.142) 
% Candidates Electoral Margin (t-1) -0.431 
(0.319) 
   
     
%Parties Electoral Margin (t-1)  -0.422   
  (0.396)   
#Candidates (t-1)   0.0164  
   (0.0255)  
#Parties (t-1)    0.0019 
    (0.0140) 
Constant 12.93*** 13.75*** 12.85*** 12.66*** 
 (1.216) (1.318) (1.217) (1.425) 
     
Controls All All All All 
Province and year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Polynomial First First First First 
Interaction term First First First First 
Optimal Bandwidth Half IK Half IK Half IK Half IK 
Observations 1,403 1,230 1,403 1,233 
R-squared 0.351 0.335 0.351 0.332 
Note: Municipalities between 11,275 and 18,725 inhabitants. Sharp RDD estimates. We control for province and year fixed effects and 
we focus on the period 1994-2017. Estimation method: LLR with a first order polynomial of the forcing. Standard Errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the municipal level (shown in brackets). Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 
5% level by **, and at 1% level by ***. 
 
As a final robustness check, in Table 10 we have carried out a falsification exercise in the spirit of 
Lee (2008). We have used fake thresholds where no major change in policy is expected, in order to 
assess the possibility that our results depend on random factors rather than on a specific cause-effect 
relationship. In particular, we have chosen two fake population thresholds of 13,000 and 21,000 
inhabitants respectively (the results yielded were identical also when we used different fake 
population cut-offs). Then, we have replicated the aforementioned Sharp RDD estimations with half 
IK optimal bandwidths (municipalities with a population size between 11,010 and 14,990, and 
between 16,040 and 25,960 respectively), adding a linear polynomial of the forcing variable along 
with a first order interaction term. Results are presented in Table 10. We can notice that the effect of 
our variable of interest is far from being significant at conventional levels.  
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Table 10. Effect of Electoral System on Average Education. Placebo Test. Sharp RDD.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
VARIABLES Education of 
Politicians 
High Skill Education of 
Politicians 
High Skill 
     
Fake Threshold 13,000 0.2192 0.0171   
 (0.1545) (0.0239)   
Fake Threshold 21,000   0.0361 -0.0036 
   (0.1623) (0.0209) 
Constant 12.65*** 0.783*** 8.416*** 0.632*** 
 (1.253) (0.174) (1.381) (0.141) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Population Polynomial First First First First 
Interaction term First First First First 
Optimal Bandwidth Half IK Half IK Half IK Half IK 
Observations 1,165 1,175 1,008 1,021 
R-squared 0.408 0.594 0.424 0.695 
Note: Sharp RDD estimates. We control for province and year fixed effects and we focus on the period 1994-2017. Estimation method: 
LLR. Standard Errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the municipal level (shown in brackets). Significance at the 
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at 1% level by ***. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
One of the major concerns in all modern democracies is that the general level of education might 
register a dramatic downward shift. As a matter of fact, since the 1990s the percentage of newly 
elected politicians with a degree has decreased steadily by roughly 28% at the national level in Italy. 
This trend can also be observed at the municipal level. Consequently, the selection of high quality 
politicians is crucial for the well-functioning of any kind of democracy, as widely highlighted by the 
theoretical literature (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 2004).  
In our paper we have empirically investigated the effect of an exogenous change — as decided by 
population threshold — in the electoral system (single ballot vs runoff) on the quality of local 
politicians as measured by the average educational attainment. Findings show that in municipalities 
voting under runoff rule (just above the threshold) the average years of schooling of local politicians 
is lower by roughly 2% with respect to the educational attainment of politicians in cities where a 
single-ballot scheme is applied (just below the threshold). We have also found that changes in the 
electoral system negatively affect the level of education of mayors, councilors, and male local 
politicians, whereas no effect is found on aldermen and female politicians. 
The results yielded are similar when we measure the quality of politicians in terms of past 
employment and past political experience, and when we control for different predetermined measures 
of political closeness. Also, findings do not change when we adopt several specifications of our model 
(different optimal bandwidths and second order polynomials of the forcing variable) to check the 
sensitivity in terms of sign, significance, and magnitude of the runoff effect on our outcome variables. 
We speculate that the negative effect is exclusively driven by the different selection process of 
politicians adopted by parties under the two divergent regimes. In municipalities voting under a single 
ballot, the candidate who collects a majority of votes (elected mayor) wins the control of government 
(along with the only list that supported him/her during elections) and appropriates all office rents, 
because he/she will certainly have a majority within the council. In this case, if the ultimate goal is to 
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win the electoral competition thereby securing the whole office rents, then the only list supporting 
the mayor candidate is assumed to be composed by high quality candidates who can achieve that goal. 
On the contrary, in municipalities voting under runoff this may not happen, because the mayor may 
be elected along with a council controlled by the opposition. Also, the parties winning the elections 
can aspire to influence government, and hence participate in the division of office rents, depending 
on the share of votes obtained in the election. This mechanism explaining the willingness of parties 
not to select high skilled candidates in runoff elections suggest how parties should think carefully 
both on which candidates they should invest more as well as who is more appropriate in terms of 
educational attainment to become politician, as political parties’ actions are likely to generate possibly 
unintended differences in terms of politicians’ quality, and in turn, in terms of efficiency of the local 
public administration and of citizens’ well-being. 
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